

**Bombs Away: A Strategic Analysis of Airpower
In Limited Conflict**

**A Monograph
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ABSTRACT

BOMBS AWAY: A STRATEGIC ANALYSIS OF AIRPOWER IN LIMITED CONFLICT by Major Jody L. Blanchfield, USAF, 55 pages.

Airpower has a significant influence within the American political process. Political debate over the application of airpower in limited conflicts involves when and how to use it, and whether it can be the sole means of military force.

This monograph looks at limited conflicts in which the National Command Authorities decided to use airpower to produce specific results. It assesses the effectiveness of the application of airpower relative to the strategic political objectives of these conflicts. The monograph examines whether airpower contributed to creating a set of systemic conditions that compelled the enemy to concede. The application of airpower should have complimented the other instruments of national power. It should have been applied in accordance with the given strategic political environment. Specifically, as the military theorist Carl Von Clausewitz would have required, the means should have matched the ends.

The monograph examines three limited conflicts in which airpower played a primary role. The first conflict is the Vietnam War, with the Rolling Thunder and Linebacker campaigns. The second conflict is El Dorado Canyon against Libya in 1986. The study concludes with the most recent conflict involving U.S. forces, Allied Force in Kosovo. The monograph centers on three primary questions relative to these conflicts: 1) Was the application of airpower in line with the identified military and political objectives in the conflict? 2) Did the airpower means match the ends? 3) What were the conditions that ultimately caused hostilities to cease, and what role did airpower play in creating those conditions?

The monograph answers these questions by examining the political context, strategic and military objectives, and the stated U.S. policy in each conflict. It examines the nature of the conflict, the nature of the enemy, and the U.S. national interests at stake. It examines how risk assessment may have influenced decisions to use airpower. It also analyzes airpower apportionment and targeting, and determines if it was appropriate for the political objectives sought in each conflict. The purpose of this monograph is to examine the effectiveness of airpower application to the political process for which it is intended to support and compliment.

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I. INTRODUCTION

The technological advances in American military airpower over the last fifty years have been tremendous. Airpower theory has evolved and employment doctrine has changed in response to these new technological capabilities. Consequently, airpower has a significant influence within the American political process. Political debate over the application of airpower in limited conflicts centers not only on when and how to use it, but whether it can, and sometimes should, be the sole means of military action.

Airpower has transitioned over the last few decades from a predominantly tactical arm in support of land-based forces, to a strategic arm dominating initial hostility phases prior to offensive ground phases, to ultimately being employed as the sole military means to achieve political ends. The crisis in Kosovo prompted Operation Allied Force in early 1999. Allied Force was one of the unique limited conflicts in which airpower alone was the military instrument of force. The American National Command Authorities not only supported the sole use of airpower, but also publicly declared a ground force option as off the table.¹ How effectively airpower influenced this conflict continues to be debated by military and political leaders alike, and will be examined further in this paper.

The international political environment is a complex system. Consequently, the instruments of national power utilized by the U.S. in limited conflicts are inextricably linked to one another. Instruments of national power include diplomatic, economic, and informational processes, in addition to military force. It is an erroneous assumption that military action is independent of the

strategic political environment of a given conflict. Therefore, in order to effectively analyze and assess military actions, such as the application of airpower, emphasis must also be placed on strategic analysis of the various other factors of the conflict. These include the nature of the conflict, the nature of the enemy, the national interests at stake, and the assessment of risk. However, the most important consideration is the political objective.

The military theorist Carl Von Clausewitz best articulated the importance of this factor in one of his most famous points, that war is a continuation of policy by other means.² Clausewitz understood that the political objective should determine both the military objective to be achieved and the amount of effort it should require. He stated that the political objective was the goal, and that the means applied in war could never be considered isolated from their purpose.³ This paper specifically focuses on airpower as the means applied to achieve political purposes during conflicts in U.S. military history.

Given the complex international political environment and the systemic relationship of the instruments of national power, rarely does one single element or action independently achieve an end state in limited conflicts. Rather, the various instruments of national power should compliment and support one another. The focus should be on using all instruments to create a set of conditions that ultimately compels the enemy to concede or negotiate. Therefore, identifying and quantifying "measures of success" for a given military action is very difficult because, as Clausewitz knew, it is not an isolated action. Politics occur in a dynamic, adaptive system. The political environment may

change during the conflict, or the conflict may have been initiated without clear political objectives or end states. The enemy may negotiate at peace talks to conditions that were not previously or publicly identified, cease-fires may be declared, and hostilities ended without what the military defines as "decisive victories."

Consequently, the issue of decisiveness in limited conflicts may be a moot point. Debates over the decisiveness of airpower have raged for decades, probably in vain in the context of limited conflict. The political process is rarely seeking a decisive end to the root of the conflict. Generally, an end to the immediate crisis driving hostilities is what is sought. Once the immediate threat is neutralized, the focus is on peaceful and diplomatic means to further political relations among the nations. As the conflict itself is defined as limited, so too are the objectives and end states: limited to a given point in time within the political continuum.

International politics and U.S. foreign relations occur within a dynamic, ever-evolving, adaptive process. The U.S. continually modifies its policies towards foreign nations, and has remained "engaged" for decades in geographic areas such as Europe, and both Northeast and Southwest Asia. More often than not, the U.S. military once deployed maintains a presence in areas of prior conflict long after actual conflict resolution. More importantly, history has shown that a given "solution" to one conflict, such as redefining political nation-state borders, may ultimately end up as a catalyst for a future conflict years later, such as is the case with the Balkan states.⁴

Therefore, this monograph does not examine the specific military "decisiveness" of airpower. The focus is on whether airpower was instrumental in contributing to an acceptable political result at that particular time for the given conflict. Some studies concerning the application of airpower characterize it as a competing force to land power, generally arguing the dominance or importance of one force over the other. These types of studies attempt to prove whether air or ground forces were "more" or "less" instrumental, compared to each other, in achieving specific results in conflicts. Whether conflict resolution was best achieved with air or ground forces is not the focus of this study.

This study deems that question irrelevant because the political process does not always seek the best military strategy. There often are other factors that must be considered which might make the "best" military option politically unacceptable. The U.S. military is used as an extension of the political process. Therefore, the relevant question in this monograph is whether the application of airpower as military force produced an acceptable political solution. The monograph does not question whether airpower was indeed the "best" military option as opposed to other types of military force. The National Command Authorities ultimately decide what force to use in a given conflict and may or may not consider military advice.

This monograph looks at limited conflicts in which the National Command Authorities decided to use airpower to produce specific results. It assesses the effectiveness of the application of airpower relative to the political objectives. It examines the changes in airpower application over the course of time, both

within and between different conflicts. It does this by examining whether or not airpower contributed to creating a set of systemic conditions necessary to compel the enemy to concede in the different conflicts. The application of airpower should have complimented the other instruments of national power. It should have been applied in accordance with the given strategic political environment. Specifically, as Clausewitz would have required, the means should have matched the ends.

This monograph examines three limited conflicts in which airpower played a primary role. The study begins by analyzing the application of airpower during a conflict in which several different air operations were conducted, the Vietnam War. It moves on to examine a single air operation against Libya in 1986, Operation El Dorado Canyon. The study concludes with the most recent conflict involving U.S. forces, one in which airpower was the only force employed during the conflict phase, Operation Allied Force in Kosovo. The monograph centers on three primary questions relative to these conflicts:

1. Was the application of airpower in line with the identified military and political objectives in the conflict?
2. Did the airpower means match the ends?
3. What were the conditions that ultimately caused hostilities to cease, and what role did airpower play in creating those conditions?

The monograph answers these questions by examining the political context, strategic and military objectives, and the stated U.S. policy in each of these conflicts. The monograph examines the nature of the conflict, the nature of the

enemy, and the U.S. national interests at stake. It examines how risk assessment may have influenced decisions to use airpower. It also considers the employment of airpower, in terms of apportionment and targeting, and determines if it was appropriate for the political objectives sought in each conflict. The purpose of this monograph is to examine the effectiveness of airpower application to the political process for which it is intended to support and compliment.⁵

II. VIETNAM: OPERATIONS ROLLING THUNDER, AND LINEBACKER I AND II

This chapter examines the political elements of the war and the role of airpower in these three campaigns. Vietnam remains an enigma to the United States, both militarily and politically. It is one of the few conflicts that was not "won." The U.S. withdrew forces and did not meet the political objective of the conflict, which was to preserve a South Vietnam independent from Communist rule. The fall of Saigon in April 1975 became the ultimate symbol of failure of American policy in Southeast Asia.⁶

Vietnam contained three major air operations conducted at different times, in different manners, but with essentially the same military objective. The military objective of airpower was to compel Hanoi to cease aggression against South Vietnam and to enter and comply with peace negotiations.⁷ Operation Rolling Thunder did not succeed in achieving these objectives, but Linebacker I and II

did succeed partially, at least in compelling Hanoi to make peace concessions. However, this success did not lead to the desired political end state ultimately sought in the conflict and South Vietnam fell to communism.

Mark Clodfelter argues in *The Limits of Airpower* that American civilian and military leaders were convinced that the lethality of bombing alone assured political results.⁸ Clodfelter maintains that they failed to acknowledge that many diverse elements affect the political effectiveness of airpower.⁹ This chapter examines those diverse elements. A summary of the political context of the war follows as foundation to examining the air campaigns.

The Vietnam War roots began at the conclusion of World War II. Ho Chi Minh with his communist Viet Minh Front, seized power in Hanoi from the defeated Japanese. This led to a decade of conflict between the previous French colonial interests in Vietnam and the Viet Minh. The U.S. rendered assistance to the French beginning in 1950. After a major defeat at Dien Bien Phu in 1954, a peace agreement was signed in Geneva that split the country.¹⁰ The northern half of the country was given to the communists, and the southern half was given to nationalists who had been allied with the French. However, the national elections to unite the country that were specified in the Geneva Agreement never occurred.

Viet Minh supporters in the south were suppressed and Ho Chi Minh began to send cadres into the south to strengthen his communist movement. These southern supporters were popularly called Viet Cong. By 1961, the insurgency in the south was significant and President John F. Kennedy renewed

U.S. involvement.¹¹ The Kennedy Administration repeatedly stated a strategic objective of stopping Communism in Southeast Asia but was also wary of escalating the conflict.¹² For this reason, President Kennedy would not send combat troops but did send military advisors to train the South Vietnamese in counterinsurgency operations. The South Vietnamese government continued to weaken. It was overthrown by a military coup in 1963. The U.S. government hoped the new regime would stabilize the south, but it did not. The Viet Cong influence continued to increase in the southern regions.

In August 1964, North Vietnamese patrol boats in the Tonkin Gulf attacked U.S. naval ships. President Lyndon B. Johnson ordered air strikes on North Vietnam as a punitive action and obtained congressional authorization to begin sending troops.¹³ After a U.S. camp at Pleiku was attacked by the Viet Cong in February 1965, President Johnson initiated a sustained campaign of air strikes, Operation Rolling Thunder, and finally committed ground combat troops in the conflict.¹⁴

Rolling Thunder spanned February 1965 until the end of October in 1968. It was a frequently interrupted bombing campaign against targets in North Vietnam essentially designed to induce Hanoi to stop supporting aggression against South Vietnam. There was a vast dissention over the strategic policy and the military means of bombing within the Johnson Administration itself and among the military leaders. While there was consensus to apply increased pressure against North Vietnam, there was no agreement over the air strategy to produce a specific end state.¹⁵

The problem that existed for Rolling Thunder was a classic political paradox framed again by Carl Von Clausewitz. Clausewitz described the importance of weighing the positive and negative character of the political ends sought in war.¹⁶ Essentially, positive aims are those attainable by applying military force, and negative aims are achievable only by limiting military force.¹⁷ Clausewitz warned of the danger of a preponderantly negative policy, the one certain effect would be to retard the decision.¹⁸ Relative to the Vietnam conflict, this meant it was necessary to appropriately weight or prioritize the positive and negative political ends in order to apply an appropriate military means. This presented problems for President Johnson.

Like President Kennedy before him, President Johnson maintained the need to stop Communism in South Vietnam. He further believed that a failure to do so would cause a loss of American prestige around the world.¹⁹ President Johnson was also extremely concerned about the conflict escalating to Chinese and Russian involvement. Therefore, as he was trying to achieve a negative aim of avoiding direct intervention by China or the Soviet Union, he was also trying to achieve the positive objective of maintaining both an independent non-Communist South Vietnam and American prestige.²⁰ The effect that this paradox had in Rolling Thunder was an air campaign with a wide variation in scope, intensity, and target sets over the course of three years as it vainly tried to achieve contradictory aims.

President Johnson himself also closely controlled it, because he was extremely concerned that too much force would aggravate the Chinese or

Soviets.²¹ As Clausewitz predicted, the effect of too much emphasis on the negative ends restricted and in fact nullified the military force applied. Mark Clodfelter additionally argues that political control on airpower flows directly from negative objectives.²² Consequently, the early phases of Rolling Thunder had very little impact on compelling Hanoi to do anything.

However, the Johnson Administration hoped that bombing could successfully conclude the war more quickly and cheaply than large-scale ground warfare.²³ A 1965 memorandum from National Security Advisor McGeorge Bundy to President Johnson offers more insight into the decision to mount an air campaign. This memo supports the assertion that use of force decisions may be driven by a need to do something militarily even if that something is unable to attain the political objective. Bundy's memo stated:

"We cannot assert that a policy of sustained reprisal [bombing against North Vietnam] will succeed in changing the course of the contest in Vietnam, but even if it fails, the policy will have been worth it. At a minimum, it will damp down the charge that we did not do all we could have done, and this charge will be important in many countries, including our own."²⁴

Bundy's statement alludes that the purpose of early air operations in Vietnam may simply have been a show of force or of U.S. resolve, a quite different purpose than the military objective with Hanoi that was publicly sought. This concept to at least do something militarily for a political goal will be revisited in Chapters Two and Five regarding other conflicts.

Why was Rolling Thunder continued for three years? Noted Vietnam historian Stanley Karnow asserts that the bombing campaign took on a life of its own. Karnow believes that wars generate their own momentum, and the typically

American answer to the early failure of the air campaign was: "more and bigger."²⁵ Mark Clodfelter cites that President Johnson, Secretary of State Dean Rusk and Secretary of Defense Robert McNamara were all convinced that sending ground troops into North Vietnam would lead to nuclear war, and so they continued to hope that airpower could deter escalating ground combat.²⁶ Aside from these views, another reason relates directly to the initial disagreement over the appropriate use of airpower. Intense debate continued throughout Rolling Thunder within the national security bureaucracy over the true effects of the bombing, as well as over what the target sets should be.²⁷ Rolling Thunder had begun as an estimated eight-to-twelve week operation of retaliation. It became a multi-phase operation of "sustained pressure" of unspecified duration as various military strategies were attempted.²⁸

To summarize these phases, Rolling Thunder initially focused on interdicting the logistical system of southern North Vietnam, and thus its capacity to infiltrate men and supplies into South Vietnam. Due to the harsh failure criticism, the area of operations expanded to include targets all over North Vietnam up to the Chinese border.²⁹ The next phase involved concentrated attacks specifically against the petroleum storage facilities. Next, Rolling Thunder transitioned into a campaign aimed against industrial targets, such as electrical plants, the lone steel mill and cement plants. Rivers and coastlines were mined. By fall of 1967, almost every target with military or industrial value had been bombed, and estimated as either damaged or destroyed.³⁰ However, there still was no measurable effect on the war in South Vietnam.

Air Force leaders at this time advocated a campaign designed to wreck the economy of North Vietnam. They believed that destroying the "modern" elements of the country would render an impotent enemy. However, they were no longer sure that transportation or petroleum facilities were vital centers to be destroyed.³¹ They were unable to articulate any essential element of the North's war-making capacity outside of an industrial entity, however. They ascribed the failure of the bombing to produce any discernable effect on the war due to the political control of President Johnson and the restraints imposed on the use of airpower.³² This was a significant failure on the part of Air Force leaders to correctly assess the nature of the enemy. They viewed North Vietnam much the same way as their own country, believing its military strength had to come from its industrial and economic base, which in fact, it did not.³³

Combined with pressure from Congress, the Air Force, and the American public, President Johnson finally lifted the political control on bombing.³⁴ The next phase of Rolling Thunder crept increasingly closer to Hanoi and Haiphong, which had previously been off limits. Power plants were bombed darkening the cities, railroad bridges were destroyed, and any remaining industrial and transportation facilities were destroyed. At the conclusion of this phase, the only military options that remained were targeting civilian population centers and dikes that would flood the cities, or to launch a ground invasion into the North.³⁵ Debate continued within the Administration over the effect of the bombing. However, this debate ended when North Vietnam and the Viet Cong launched a

major offensive over the Tet holiday into South Vietnam at the end of January 1968.

After the notorious Tet Offensive, Rolling Thunder was severely scaled back. It had failed to degrade the capability of the North to launch offensive operations, and it had failed in degrading the North's will to wage war. This was dismally evident by the Tet Offensive itself.³⁶ Airpower was still focused on interdiction in the southern part of North Vietnam, in areas south of the Twentieth Parallel beginning in March 1968. The air operation area was further reduced to the Nineteenth and then Seventeenth Parallels, until the air campaign was abandoned altogether by President Johnson in the fall of 1968.

The Linebacker I and II air campaigns waged during Vietnam occurred several years later under the administration of President Richard M. Nixon. These two air campaigns were startling short in relation to Rolling Thunder. Linebacker I occurred from May to October of 1972 and Linebacker II lasted only twelve days in December 1972. Both were much more successful in terms of achieving their military and political objectives. However, as stated earlier, this did not correspond to political victory in Vietnam. Why the Linebacker campaigns were successful and Rolling Thunder was not has to do with significant changes in the strategic political environment. This enabled airpower to be politically effective.

One of the critical elements of change concerns the North Vietnamese military strategy. By 1972, they were mounting large-scale conventional ground operations designed to capture South Vietnam cities and defeat the southern

Army of the Republic of Vietnam.³⁷ This was vastly different from previous guerrilla insurgency operations conducted throughout the rural heartland, and it was significantly more vulnerable to air interdiction. One of the reasons for the North's strategy change was that American ground troops had withdrawn almost completely from South Vietnam.³⁸ This was because President Nixon was not seeking the same broad strategic aims that President Johnson had. President Nixon's aims were more limited. He had goals of negotiation and Vietnamization in order to end U.S. involvement. He stated that the U.S. would continue fighting until the Communists agreed to a fair peace or until the South could defend themselves on their own.³⁹ However, with increasingly less U.S. ground presence, his primary military means had to be air and naval power.

This situation led to another change in the strategic environment. President Nixon approved the mining of Haiphong Harbor in an effort to isolate Hanoi from its external supply source with the Soviets. Nearly 85 percent of North Vietnam's most sophisticated military equipment came from the Soviet Union through the port at Haiphong.⁴⁰ Mining the harbor was a controversial action that had been planned since 1965 but had always been deemed as too confrontational to Moscow.

President Nixon risked it now because he had also been working to improve U.S. relations with the Soviet Union as well as with China. These two countries had been involved in a series of skirmishes along their mutual border since 1969. Both were seeking American support as a counterweight to a potential conflict. Additionally, China was seeking American support to end

isolationism, and the Soviets were involved with U.S. strategic arms and grain import negotiations.⁴¹ President Nixon arranged presidential visits to both countries. He therefore did not have the negative aims working against his air campaigns with the associated limitations and contradiction of purpose that President Johnson had faced. While both nations verbally criticized U.S. bombing actions in Vietnam in 1972, neither took any action that would damage relations with the U.S.

Linebacker I began in May 1972 with these significant changes in the strategic environment. Like Rolling Thunder, it was primarily an interdiction campaign. The campaign had three military objectives: interdicting the roads and railroads from China to sever that external supply line into North Vietnam, destroying military storage and supply sites within the country, and interdicting the North Vietnamese supply routes to their troops fighting in South Vietnam.⁴² In yet another contrast to President Johnson, President Nixon allowed the Air Force to decide the targets, timing, and attack strength. This allowed for greater surprise, intensity, and simultaneity than had been achieved in Rolling Thunder. The air chiefs did focus on the same components of the industrial and transportation nodes as they had in Rolling Thunder. However, because the North Vietnamese were waging a conventional large-scale conflict, the effects of interdiction were readily apparent on the battlefields of the South. Hanoi agreed to a cease-fire on 22 October 1972.⁴³

The agreement went sour quickly though as South Vietnam refused to sign.⁴⁴ During the delay, Hanoi also backed away and refused to cooperate in

further negotiations. This resulted in Linebacker II, also referred to as the "Christmas Bombing," as it took place from 18-30 December 1972. The purpose of Linebacker II was to "coerce a negotiated settlement by threatening further weakening of the enemy's military effort to maintain and support his armed forces."⁴⁵ Target sets were much the same as in the previous campaign since the North had regenerated key routes and facilities in its logistics network during the delay. Linebacker II was much more intense, however, flying almost half as many sorties in twelve days as it had in the six months of Linebacker I.⁴⁶

President Nixon intended this campaign to have a definite psychological shock value. He wanted to show Hanoi that in spite of the ground troop withdrawal, the U.S. would go to serious lengths to achieve a peace settlement of the war.⁴⁷ He also wanted to send a signal of America's continued resolve and toughness to South Vietnam. Linebacker II did have extraordinary shock value. It was the most concentrated air offensive in Vietnam and generated much controversy.⁴⁸ However, President Nixon's political and military leaders considered it a successful application of military force.⁴⁹ Hanoi returned to negotiations in early January 1973 and South Vietnam accepted the January accord. Ultimately however, the North again stormed South in 1975. President Nixon was no longer President, Congress refused military intervention, and Saigon finally fell.⁵⁰

These campaigns serve to illustrate both sides of the spectrum of effective analysis of the strategic political environment in decisions to employ airpower as the military means in a limited conflict. Vietnam serves as an

excellent case study of airpower in support of political objectives for several reasons. First, the Vietnam conflict illustrates the relationship between military force and the other instruments of national power. President Nixon's diplomacy efforts with China and the Soviet Union directly affected the way in which he could employ airpower in Vietnam. Airpower was much more successful politically because of this than it had been under President Johnson's more constrained strategic environment.

Second, the Vietnam conflict allows airpower to be analyzed against both an unconventional enemy and a more conventional one. Airpower application in Rolling Thunder was not destructive enough to significantly affect North Vietnam's capability or will to wage war, as it was not effective against a rural guerrilla campaign being fought in this period of the war.⁵¹ However, because North Vietnam's military strategy had changed by 1972, the Linebacker campaigns were much more effective militarily. North Vietnam's capability to wage war was effectively targeted because it was now vulnerable to attack in a conventional large-scale ground offensive. Vietnam illustrates the importance of understanding the nature of the threat when deciding upon military means in a conflict.

Finally, the air campaigns reinforce U.S. Air Force doctrine. The Linebacker campaigns were more effective than Rolling Thunder because simultaneity, surprise, and intensity were primary elements. These continue to be key strengths that airpower brings to the battlespace.⁵²

Like Vietnam during Rolling Thunder, the next conflict to be examined also contains a very unconventional threat. The next chapter looks at airpower in the U.S. attack in Libya in 1986 against state-sponsored terrorism. Terrorism remains an unconventional threat that continues to challenge the U.S. military. The Reagan Administration chose to use airpower in direct support of specific political objectives against terrorism. As in Vietnam, the question is whether this threat could in fact be targeted with airpower, and whether it was politically effective.

III. LIBYA: OPERATION EL DORADO CANYON

In April 1986, the U.S. conducted an air assault on Libya. U.S. relations with Libya over terrorism during the 1980's can be considered a limited conflict, although not in the traditional sense. The U.S. held Libya responsible for specific terrorist attacks in which Americans were killed, and individual military clashes in the Gulf of Sidra immediately precipitated the air strike operation. However, there was no formal military retaliation by Libya in response to El Dorado Canyon. The operation bears analysis in this monograph because it was one single air attack operation conducted specifically and directly in support of strategic political objectives. As well as being a unique employment of airpower, Operation El Dorado Canyon stunned the international community and was a powerful statement on the capability of U.S. airpower.

The attention to state-sponsored terrorism by Western nations had increased dramatically in the 1980's as terrorist incidents rose. There were more than 3,000 attacks in 1985 compared to less than 300 in 1970.⁵³ Libya was a key supporter of terrorist activities and training. This was the result of Colonel Muammar al-Qaddafi seizing power in a 1969 coup and becoming the ruler of the nation. Colonel Qaddafi was becoming increasingly belligerent and much of his aggression was directed towards the U.S. He maintained a close relationship with the internationally notorious Palestinian terrorist, Abu Nidal.⁵⁴ Colonel Qaddafi publicly applauded what he called "heroic actions" as Nidal's group conducted several bombings that claimed lives in 1985.⁵⁵

Political leaders in the U.S. increasingly felt compelled to act and send a signal to terrorists. President Ronald Reagan set the stage for military responses to terrorist activities by issuing National Security Decision Directives 138 and 207, which established U.S. policies of preemptive and retaliatory strikes against terrorists.⁵⁶

Tensions with the U.S. and Libya climaxed in early 1986 after two critical events. The first concerned the Gulf of Sidra and what Colonel Qaddafi had termed his "Line of Death." Colonel Qaddafi had declared that the line at 32 degrees 30 minutes north latitude defined the northernmost edge of the Gulf of Sidra and separated it from the rest of the Mediterranean Sea.⁵⁷ He warned that the Gulf belonged to Libya and was not international waters. He declared that foreign ships and aircraft were subject to attack if they crossed the line. This

measure thus excluded from all nations a huge expanse of over 3,200 square-miles of ocean and airspace that had always been considered international.

U.S. aircraft carriers, support vessels, and attack submarines entered the Gulf on 24 March 1986 to conduct "freedom of navigation" operations intended to assert free international passage.⁵⁸ It has been suggested that both the Reagan Administration and the U.S. Navy were seeking to provoke an attack in order to garner domestic and international support to justify retaliatory actions against Libya.⁵⁹ Regardless of the motivation, skirmishes ensued over the next two days. Libya sent air interceptors toward the fleet, which were attacked in turn by naval aircraft. Libya fired air defense missiles, and the Navy attacked fixed air defense missile sites. After two of five Libyan naval attack vessels were sunk, the U.S. claimed it had made its point and withdrew the fleet south on 27 March.⁶⁰

The other critical incident leading to the air attack was the bombing of a well-known U.S. military after-hours hangout in Berlin, the La Belle Discotheque. This attack occurred on 5 April 1986, within two weeks after the Gulf of Sidra events. The attack claimed the lives of two U.S. servicemen and injured 79 Americans.⁶¹ Three separate terrorist groups claimed responsibility for the attack, but both the U.S. and West Germany independently announced "incontrovertible intelligence" assigning blame to Libya.⁶² Both countries had separately intercepted message traffic between Berlin and Tripoli, transmitted both before the attack and then citing success afterwards. The Reagan Administration decided to retaliate.

The background for Operation El Dorado Canyon lays out the strategic political objective quite clearly, as did President Reagan's National Security Directives. The U.S. wanted to send a worldwide message to state-sponsored terrorism and a particular warning to Colonel Qaddafi. The Reagan Administration was well aware of allegations that direct action might provoke even more attacks. However, information existed of several plots still currently being planned or recently thwarted. President Reagan therefore believed that they had nothing to lose by waging a specific attack at this time against Libya.⁶³ Military force against Libya might deter further actions already being plotted, in addition to sending a punitive message.

Operation El Dorado Canyon was publicly presented as both preemptive and retaliatory. President Reagan issued a statement emphasizing that the air strikes against Libya were a matter of U.S. self defense, "Self defense is not only our right, it is our duty. It is the purpose behind the mission...a mission fully consistent with Article 51 of the UN Charter."⁶⁴ The air raid was designed to hit directly at Colonel Qaddafi's ability to sponsor terrorism and provide him "incentives and reasons to alter his criminal behavior."⁶⁵

In his comprehensive account of El Dorado Canyon, Brian L. Davis reports that no military option other than air strikes was considered.⁶⁶ Additionally, it was believed that neither the American public nor U.S. allies would have supported extensive operations against Libya.⁶⁷ The only questions concerned targets and tactics for the air attack. The National Command Authorities wanted to minimize risk to U.S. personnel as well as to Libyan

civilians. The attack was to take place at night to reduce the threat of anti-aircraft weapons and to take advantage of the poor night-flying capabilities of the Libyan air force. As in the Vietnam Linebacker II campaigns, the focus was on surprise and simultaneity to accomplish both psychological shock and destruction of terrorist facilities. President Reagan told his aides, "Try to make the world smaller for terrorists."⁶⁸

The operation was launched on 14 April 1986 and hit five preplanned targets. President Reagan had left the attack planning completely up to the military. However, similar to President Johnson during Rolling Thunder, the final targets for the raid were selected at the National Security Council level "within the circle of the President's advisors."⁶⁹ Four targets were selected that had a direct connection to terrorist activity: the Aziziyah barracks (believed to be the command and control headquarters for Libyan terrorism), the Sidi Bilal base (believed to be a naval commando center, training terrorists in underwater sabotage), the Jamahiriyah military barracks (believed to be another terrorist command post, also housing Colonel Qaddafi's palace guard), and the military facilities at Tripoli's primary airport.⁷⁰ The Benina air base was also selected as a preemptive target due to Libyan fighter aircraft and an SA-5 air defense missile site, both threats to the bombers.⁷¹

The actual attack within Libyan air space took less than fifteen minutes and all five targets were severely damaged.⁷² The barracks and training complexes were destroyed, as well as the SA-5 site and several aircraft, helicopters, and buildings at the Benina airfield. Buildings and aircraft were also

destroyed on the military side of the Tripoli airport. U.S. and British aerial photography and European diplomats on the ground in Libya confirmed damage.⁷³ Both Armed Forces Radio and the NBC Nightly News carried news of the attack as it was in progress, with statements from both Secretary of State George Schultz and Secretary of Defense Casper Weinberger.⁷⁴

The amount of casualties, particularly civilian deaths, remains another controversial element of the raid. It was difficult to determine fact from fiction as the Qaddafi regime maximized media propaganda over the attack. U.S. figures generally cited and supported by experts include casualties around one hundred, with approximately thirty deaths.⁷⁵ One U.S. aircraft was lost, its two pilots killed.

In yet another parallel to Rolling Thunder, assessing the effects of the bombing against such an unconventional threat was difficult and fraught with debate. While both the U.S. and Libya confirmed the actual damage to the military targets, the political effects were much less conclusive and subject to varying interpretations. Brian Davis offers one of the most comprehensive analyses supported by substantive sources.⁷⁶ Among the primary effects investigated by Davis was the result on the Libyan population and military.

Davis refers to the U.S. air attack prompting "utter confusion, far out of proportion to the damage incurred."⁷⁷ Revolutionary elements in Tripoli engaged in looting. The tense Libyan military anticipated more attacks and rained anti-aircraft fire shrapnel over the city, attributed to nervousness and futile attempts to target high-flying reconnaissance aircraft conducting damage assessment.⁷⁸

Libyan media fed the rumors of more U.S. air raids. Subsequent explosions rocked the city the day after the U.S. attack, and the Libyan air force began to attack ground forces believed to be rebels attempting to overthrow the regime in the confusion. The result of all this was a mass exodus of civilians from Tripoli as they fled the city.

The fact that Colonel Qaddafi disappeared for the 48 hours following the attack contributed to his capital's temporary instability. This fueled rumors both inside Libya as well as in the international community that he had been targeted and killed in U.S. air raid.⁷⁹ He did appear on television three days later, condemning the U.S. and British leadership as murderers.

Only a handful of foreign nations supported El Dorado Canyon, the rest of the international response was overwhelmingly negative.⁸⁰ However, even the nations that condemned the U.S. attack were careful to denounce both terrorism and Colonel Qaddafi in their commentaries. Japan refused to take a public position. The Soviet Union rebuked the U.S. and cancelled a planned presidential summit preparation meeting in protest. However, the Reagan-Gorbachev summit occurred anyway later in October. The air attack did serve to strain relations between the Soviets and Libya. Colonel Qaddafi expressed displeasure with the Soviets their lukewarm support and the inferior Soviet air defense equipment Libya had purchased from them.⁸¹ The Soviets in turn did not attend key diplomatic events in Tripoli that summer.

In addition to weakening Colonel Qaddafi's position in Libya and the international world, the U.S. attack also damaged his reputation the Arab world.

Immediately following the bombing, Colonel Qaddafi called on all Arab nations to sever relations with the U.S., halt pumping Arab oil, withdraw Arab assets from the U.S. and apply sanctions against both the U.S. and Great Britain. Great Britain was drawn into the conflict because of allowing some attack planes to be launched from U.S. bases there. Additionally, Colonel Qaddafi called on the nations of Morocco, Algeria, Egypt, Jordan, and Syria to immediately bomb the U.S. Sixth Fleet, which had provided navy attack assets.⁸²

None of the Arab nations complied with Colonel Qaddafi's public demands. Syria, Sudan, Algeria, Saudi Arabia, and Iraq strongly condemned the U.S. actions, but did nothing further. Iraq even simultaneously rebuked Colonel Qaddafi's efforts to blackmail the Arab states and exploit the air attacks to further his own regime. Egypt expressed worry and concern for the event, but confirmed there were no problems between Egypt and the U.S. Jordan likewise skirted the issue, stating that the American measure was a dangerous but sensitive issue. Tunisia refused public comment. The obvious lack of support from the Arab world sent an embarrassing signal about Colonel Qaddafi and Libya's standing in that community.⁸³

In spite of all the above strategic political fallout, did the application of airpower as military force ultimately compel Libya to cease support of terrorist activities against the U.S.? Most evidence supports the answer that it did not. This monograph maintains that is mostly attributable to the nature of the threat. As with guerrilla insurgency in Vietnam, it is very difficult to measure the effects of attacks on unconventional threats, both militarily and politically. But it is

particularly inconclusive to measure the effects of attack against such abstract threats, such as a capability to support terrorist acts.

Terrorist training facilities, leaders, and organizations are difficult to identify and attack, particularly with airpower. If they are attacked, they are easy to regenerate quickly. In spite of the five targets destroyed in Libya in El Dorado Canyon, the U.S. government was aware of over thirty in Libya at the time.⁸⁴ So, it is unlikely that the destruction of five targets significantly affected Libya's actual capability to support terrorism. Additionally, a common response was that Libya continued its involvement, but its sponsorship was simply far less visible after the air raid.⁸⁵ Colonel Qaddafi did stop making public announcements supporting terrorist activities after the attack, unlike what he had done before the attack. That much of his behavior had changed, but it was hardly evidence that his terrorist network in Libya had changed.

Did international terrorist act against the U.S. and its citizens end? In the two weeks following the attack, there were isolated shootings, hostage deaths, and an attempted bombing.⁸⁶ Author Brian Davis claims that this quick flurry of activity ceased by mid-May 1986. However, the U.S. State Department held Libya as the third most active state sponsor of terrorism, training, arming, and financing throughout 1987 and 1988. Conversely, the State Department also reported international terrorist incidents directed at U.S. targets declined by 25 percent from 1986 to 1987, and terrorism fatalities for Americans dropped from 38 in 1985, to twelve in 1986, to seven in 1987.⁸⁷ It seemed during these years that while international terrorism with Libyan involvement did not decline, overt

action against American targets and citizens did. Unfortunately, in December 1988, suspected Libyan terrorists bombed Pan Am Flight 103, killing 270 people, including 189 Americans.⁸⁸ It took over a decade of international effort to bring the suspected Libyans to trial. The ultimate conclusion is that El Dorado Canyon did not effectively reduce Libyan terrorism against Americans. It apparently only pushed it into highly covert operations and eliminated public statements from Colonel Qaddafi.

However, another take on the strategic political objective suggests that the Libyan air strike was not about terrorism at all, but rather about the global role of the U.S. Authors Mary Kaldor and E.P. Thompson theorize in their book, *Mad Dogs*, that the strike was about U.S. military power and the reassertion of a dominant American position among European allies and the Third World.⁸⁹ They view the attack on Libya as a culmination of developments in U.S. foreign policy and military strategy with Libyan terrorism an international veil. They believe the attack was intended to increase the visibility of the American arsenal as well as the resolve and willingness to use it if provoked, particularly the way Libya was provoking the U.S.⁹⁰

There may well have been a secondary political agenda, but American authorities have never acknowledged it. The attack did highlight Colonel Qaddafi's rather complete lack of support from both the international and Arab world. A reasonable conclusion could also be that many of the countries that condemned the U.S. air raid were more upset over America's military capability

and the blatant willingness to use it in a rather ambiguous situation, than about Libya at all.

Kaldor and Thompson's theory also falls in line with the previously discussed "political need to do something militarily" from Chapter One. President Reagan gave a rallying televised address to the nation the evening shortly after the attack. President Reagan admitted he had "no illusion that tonight's action will bring down the curtain on Colonel Qaddafi's reign of terror" but that he hoped the would "bring closer a safer and more secure world for decent men and women."⁹¹ President Reagan specifically addressed the concerns of Americans over being terrorist targets,

"For us to ignore by inaction the slaughter of American civilians and soldiers...is simply not in the American tradition. When our citizens are abused or attacked anywhere in the world on the direct order of a hostile regime, we will respond so long as I'm in the Oval Office."⁹²

President Reagan also warned that he would do it again if necessary. Polls indicated overwhelming domestic support for his actions, and his popularity soared to the highest approval rating during his presidency, 70 percent.⁹³ President Reagan indeed had sent a forceful message to the world about America and most Americans apparently loved it.

This particular theory takes on even more significance when compared against a similar incident in August 1998. President William Jefferson Clinton ordered missile strikes against terrorist-associated targets in Afghanistan and Sudan. This was in retaliation for bombings of two U.S. embassies in Kenya and Tanzania by suspected terrorists.⁹⁴ As in Libya, the 1998 attack was aimed at a specific Anti-American terrorist network, this one run by Osama Bin Laden. This

air strike also had a dual preemptive goal, as the buildings targeted were believed to be production facilities for nerve gas, considered a "weapon of mass destruction."

The 1998 attack came at a particularly dismal time in the Clinton Administration, when he was under considerable controversy. This caused significant international criticism focusing on two primary areas. One area concerned the fact that it was impossible to ignore the timing of the attack relative to the investigation of President Clinton's conduct concerning an extramarital affair.⁹⁵ The other primary foreign criticism was that, unlike President Reagan, President Clinton only alluded to "convincing information" linking the embassy bombings to the Bin Laden network.⁹⁶ He never publicly presented hard evidence such as the intercepted message that President Reagan did, nor did he have a corroborating independent source of evidence like President Reagan did. Additionally, while the attack was supported by a majority of Americans, it did not have an impact on President Clinton's overall approval ratings as President Reagan's attack did.⁹⁷ This is probably due to President Clinton's acknowledged affair.

The long-term affect of the Afghanistan/Sudan air strike continues to be debated. There are divergent opinions on the effectiveness of airpower against an abstract unconventional threat such as terrorism. What is clear by President Clinton's recent action is that airpower remains the military means of choice against state-sponsored terrorism. The strategy is effective if the political end

state is simply to demonstrate U.S. reprisal against suspected nations supporting terrorism. If the political end state is to truly reduce terrorism, it remains elusive.

This chapter examined the application of airpower against the unconventional threat of terrorism. Both Rolling Thunder and El Dorado Canyon illustrate why effects are difficult to determine militarily and politically against unconventional threats. The next chapter returns to employing airpower against a conventional threat, large-scale ground offensive operations. As the Linebacker campaigns illustrated, the effect of airpower was much more apparent against a conventional threat. However, the strategic political environment was unusual in this next conflict. The belligerent regime was conducting offensive military action within its own sovereign nation against a particular ethnic population. In Allied Force, airpower was the only military force employed in efforts to achieve the political end state.

V. KOSOVO: OPERATION ALLIED FORCE

The most recent conflict involving U.S. forces was in Kosovo, a small province within the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia. While Allied Force was a NATO operation, the U.S. led both diplomatic and military efforts and was key in the decision not to pursue a ground force option in a non-permissive environment.⁹⁸ This conflict is another excellent case study for evaluating the effectiveness of airpower in achieving political objectives. Similar to Vietnam, the

application of airpower changed during the course of the conflict, and diplomacy with Russia was again a significant factor.

Problems surfaced in Kosovo in the late 1980's with the rise to power of Slobodan Milosevic in Serbia. Milosevic was a charismatic leader in the Communist Party and became instrumental in fostering "Greater Serbia" nationalism.⁹⁹ This nationalism was extremely threatening to ethnic Albanians that comprised the population majority in Kosovo. Milosevic instituted repressive policies barring Kosovar Albanians from holding positions of responsibility and ultimately abolished the autonomy previously exercised by the region. His discriminatory actions soon evolved into systematic "ethnic cleansing" hostilities designed to drive Albanians from the territory.¹⁰⁰ A series of failed diplomatic talks occurred throughout 1998 and 1999 and Milosevic repeatedly refused to end his offensive against Kosovar Albanians. Upon direction of the North Atlantic Council and the United Nations Secretary General, Operation Allied Force was conducted from 24 March to 10 June 1999.¹⁰¹

The conflict in Kosovo broke new ground because it was fought in defense of a party to a civil war within a sovereign nation.¹⁰² NATO's stated objectives during Allied Force were: a verifiable stop to all military action and the immediate ending of violence and repression; the withdrawal from Kosovo of the Serbian military, police, and paramilitary forces; the stationing in Kosovo of an international military presence; the unconditional and safe return of all refugees and displaced persons and unhindered access to them by humanitarian aid organizations; and the establishment of a political framework agreement for

Kosovo in conformity with international law and the Charter of the United Nations.¹⁰³

The Department of Defense identified three specific U.S. and NATO strategic objectives: to demonstrate the seriousness of NATO's opposition to Serbian aggression in the Balkans; to deter Milosevic from continuing and escalating his attacks on civilians and to create conditions to reverse his ethnic cleansing; and to damage Serbia's capacity to wage war by diminishing or degrading its ability to conduct military operations.¹⁰⁴

Additionally, the Department of Defense reiterated in its After-Action Report to Congress three strong international interests that were at stake.¹⁰⁵ First, Serbian aggression in Kosovo directly threatened peace throughout the Balkans and the stability of Southeastern Europe. Second, Serbian repression in Kosovo created a humanitarian crisis of staggering proportions. Lastly, Milosevic's conduct in 1998 and 1999 directly challenged the credibility of NATO and the U.S., due to flagrant violations of international agreements.

While both NATO and U.S. objectives were clear about ending Serbian aggression, neither organization took a clear stand over Kosovo independence, which was key to the nature of the conflict. U.S. and allied policies were decidedly neutral over the issue of independence and this served to hinder the military strategy.¹⁰⁶ Throughout March and April, the strategy was characterized as insufficient to persuade Milosevic to capitulate, yet sufficient enough to give the Kosovars hope for success.¹⁰⁷ This aspect reinforces Clodfelter's and Clausewitz' opposition to conflicting strategic aims that were discussed

previously. It became increasingly difficult to maintain impartiality to the parties in the conflict while exerting military force against only one of them.

The Linebacker campaigns illustrated that the effects of air power were more apparent and quantifiable against large conventional ground forces. Serbia invaded Kosovo with a conventional armored army to forcefully terrorize and coerce ethnic Albanians into fleeing. However, because this was occurring in predominately urban areas, it was difficult to target the actual military aggressors in Kosovo. Air power advocates consequently argued for a strategic attack campaign aimed at industry and transportation nodes within Belgrade, in an effort to coerce Milosevic to abandon his ethnic cleansing goals. As in Vietnam, again there was a dispute over the specific military air strategy to be employed.

The publicly stated strategy for the air campaign was attrition of military capability. The day the air strikes commenced, Secretary of Defense William S. Cohen stated, "The military objective of our action is to deter further action against the Kosovars and to diminish the ability of the Yugoslav army to continue those attacks."¹⁰⁸ President Clinton also stated that it was a military campaign to "destroy as much of [Milosevic's] military capability as we can, so that each day his capacity for repression will diminish."¹⁰⁹

However, this did not appear to be the focus of the targeting until very late in the campaign and well after the media was increasingly critical of the gap between means and ends. The beginning of the conflict saw around 250 sorties a day targeting empty buildings in Belgrade, while the closing week of the operation saw over 600 sorties aimed directly at Serb tanks in Kosovo.¹¹⁰ Even

the multitudes of refugees interviewed in a Macedonian tent-city camp questioned why the bombs weren't falling on the military units that had forced them from their homes.¹¹¹

Conversely, General Michael Short, who was the Joint Force Air Component Commander for the campaign, held fast to an asymmetric warfare strategy. General Short advocated bombing the capital of Belgrade to cut off power, deplete civilian and military fuel supplies, destroy the communication and media infrastructure, and isolate the city by destroying bridges and rail lines.¹¹² General Short believed that the key was to destroy the things that kept the Serb leadership in power and comfort, not in random bombings of military targets in Kosovo that held little importance to Serbian leaders. He criticized the "massive and laborious 'tank plinking' effort in Kosovo" as a "waste of airpower since it did little to achieve NATO's stated goals."¹¹³

Ultimate responsibility for the translation of the strategic political goals into a military operation belonged to General Short's boss, General Wesley Clark. General Clark was held to both a NATO chain of command as the Supreme Allied Commander of Europe, and a dual U.S. chain of command as the Commander-in-Chief of U.S. European Command. General Clark reiterated daily to General Short that the number one target priority was fielded forces in Kosovo. However General Clark himself stated in a press interview on 29 March 1999, "We never thought we could stop this. You can't conduct police actions from the air in any country."¹¹⁴ All of the U.S. Joint Chiefs of Staff and their Chairman had voiced opposition to their civilian superiors over whether the U.S.

security interests in Kosovo were sufficient to justify going to war.¹¹⁵ They also warned that bombing alone would not likely achieve the political aims in the conflict.

General Short employed the bulk of his forces accordingly against the enemy army, utilizing what extra resources he could against Belgrade. He stated that he ultimately was allowed to go after "more lucrative and compelling targets in Serbia proper." However, this also coincided with an increase in air power available in an attempt by NATO and the U.S. to assuage criticism.¹¹⁶

Like General Short, critics were also questioning the connection between a timid air campaign supposedly aimed at degrading Serbian military power and the desired end of terminating ethnic cleansing in Kosovo.¹¹⁷ General Short's targets of the air campaign were well publicized: Serbian air defenses, bridges over the Danube, and buildings in downtown Belgrade. These were certainly not the things that were directly threatening Kosovars. An editorial in the *New York Times* noted, "In Kosovo, as in Cambodia, Somalia, and Rwanda, ethnic cleansing is an artisanal undertaking; the work of small groups of men wielding clubs, knives, axes, pistols, rifles, flame throwers, or, at the technological high end, submachine guns."¹¹⁸ Debate continued over whether the means matched the ends, and while actual genocide numbers were difficult to establish, over 800,000 refugees had fled Kosovo by mid-June.¹¹⁹

General Clark reiterated three measures of success for the operation to General Short in his daily guidance briefing. First was protecting NATO forces in the entire theater (including Bosnia and Macedonia). Second was that the

coalition hold together. The third was a goal to not lose any airplanes or pilots.¹²⁰ It is extremely interesting that these measures of success for the operation have nothing to do with the stated military objective of degrading and destroying the Yugoslavian military capability within Kosovo.

Then there was a definite strategy shift in May, approximately six weeks into the campaign. By 3 June, the number of aircraft committed to the operation had more than doubled from the number committed at the beginning on 24 March.¹²¹ As in Rolling Thunder, what had been intended as a short, crisp, decisive air campaign to yield rapid results; apparently was becoming a lengthy, increasingly escalating air campaign of limited results against an adaptive enemy amid high controversy.¹²² The parallels of the Kosovo conflict and Vietnam were many, as were the similarities between the air campaigns.

Foreign policy analyst Ivo Daadler testified before the U.S. Senate that the strategy shift finally led to success: intensifying the bombing, inflicting real damage on key levers of Milosevic's power, and accelerating diplomacy with Russia.¹²³ By May, the other instruments of national power had combined with the air strategy efforts to produce a set of conditions that would force Milosevic to concede.¹²⁴ President Clinton had extended U.S. sanctions against Yugoslavia, and the European Union did likewise. Further, Russia agreed with the western alliance over the basic strategy to resolve the Kosovo conflict and became another key player in negotiations and discussions with Serbian leadership.

On 3 June, Milosevic's representatives accepted terms brought to Belgrade by a European Union and Russian envoy. However, on 7 June, NATO

and Yugoslav commanders failed to agree on terms of a Kosovo withdrawal and suspended talks. The bombing was intensified as NATO called on Milosevic to resume military talks immediately. Talks resumed on the evening of 8 June.

Late on 9 June a Military Technical Agreement was signed between the parties.

After confirming that Serb forces were indeed withdrawing, the UN called for a suspension of air strikes and NATO complied.¹²⁵ Author Michael Ignatieff questions the validity of such a military technical agreement. Ignatieff states that the agreement decided nothing about the future status of the disputed territory that spawned the conflict, it only spelled out the details under which a NATO force would enter Kosovo unopposed to monitor the terms of the agreement.¹²⁶

This indeed is a valid criticism, nothing has been resolved about the root of the actual conflict in Kosovo. There has only been a suspension of the violence as long as the NATO force is there to enforce peace.

In a Lesson Learned Summary developed by the Center for Strategic and International Studies for Headquarters U.S. Air Force, military analyst Anthony Cordesman assessed that,

"Serbia ultimately had to concede for four reasons. 1) The damage done by NATO air and missile power and NATO's continuing ability to attack any target with little or no loss. 2) The fact that Serbia had alienated most of the world by its ethnic cleansing activities and lost all meaningful outside political support. Once Russia joined NATO in pressing for a peace settlement on terms that offered Serbia no hope of outside aid or that the world would learn to tolerate ethnic cleansing. 3) Serbia's inability to defeat the ground operations of the Kosovo Liberation Army without exposing its forces to devastating air attack. 4) The growing prospect that NATO would pursue a ground option if NATO air and missile power did not achieve decisive results."¹²⁷

The Department of Defense reiterated these four factors in Milosevic's

capitulation. Additionally, they cited the resolve of the alliance in unity and purpose as well as the economic and diplomatic efforts as part of the combination of factors critical to achieving the settlement.¹²⁸

Defense Secretary William Cohen declared that the U.S. and NATO had met its goals with the "most precise application of airpower in history."¹²⁹ Relative to General Clark's measures of success for the operation, there were no casualties to NATO forces in theater and no pilots were lost, although two U.S. aircraft were downed by air defense systems. Resolution of the conflict at this stage involves the multinational NATO peace enforcement ground force in Kosovo for an unspecified duration.

Operation Allied Force was successful in coercing Milosevic to cease his offensive against Kosovar Albanians, at least at this point in time. It was also successful in coercing him to permit a multinational force to be established within the province for stability and support operations. Allied Force may have succeeded in diminishing or disrupting the Yugoslav ability to conduct military operations within Kosovo, but it did not destroy the country's capability to do so. Milosevic only sent one of three armies into Kosovo, and the army conducting the offensive withdrew substantial elements after the military agreement. There is debate over exactly how many tanks, airplanes, and other military assets were destroyed by airpower. But it is clearly doubtful that the air campaign had a significant effect on Yugoslavia's future military capability to conduct offensive operations.

Therefore, as with the Linebacker campaign in Vietnam, the success of

this air campaign does not guarantee successful political resolution of the conflict. Due to the ambiguity of both the U.S. and NATO's strategic political end state, Kosovo remains volatile. Since neither the U.S. nor NATO supported Kosovo independence, the assumed desired end state was for it to remain a province of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia. But it is clearly apparent that resumption of the pre-conflict status quo of an autonomous region is impossible after such a horrendous humanitarian conflict. There seems little choice but to maintain it as a NATO protectorate, as long as there is political motivation to do so.

One analyst concluded that President Clinton's strategy of limited means for limited goals looks rather canny in hindsight, "his course between inaction and over commitment maintained NATO's unity, ensured China and Russia did not veto a United Nations mandate for the war, and was the surest way to preserve domestic support."¹³⁰ Again, the political need to do something militarily may have been at play here. Both NATO and the U.S. were under great pressure to "do something" about the humanitarian crisis in Kosovo. However, it was a complex situation because of the sovereignty of the region. In retrospect, President Clinton and NATO opted first for a military strategy that carried less military and political risk than committing ground troops to combat. Then, much attention was paid to the other factors that would reinforce the chosen military strategy for an overall effect.

The crucial flaw is that the root causes of the conflict remain unresolved. There has been no direct movement toward any type of permanent resolution

between the Kosovars desiring liberation and the Serbs who insist on retaining possession of the Kosovo territory for ethnic and religious reasons.

VI. CONCLUSION AND SUMMARY

There are several conclusions that can be drawn from this study. The first and most important one is that airpower offers a unique military force option to political leaders. However, careful analysis that must be given to prominent factors in the conflict when considering airpower as a force option. This analysis is critical when determining if indeed airpower can effectively support and achieve political objectives.

Utilizing airpower as military force demands an understanding of the nature of the enemy and/or threat. The historical analysis in this paper highlighted differences between conventional ground force threats and unconventional abstract threats, such as terrorism. Airpower may not always be an effective means of targeting different threats. Large-scale conventional ground forces may be very vulnerable to air attack as they were in Iraq's open desert during Desert Storm. However, Allied Force illustrates how difficult it can be to effectively target them in an urban environment. Rolling Thunder expressly demonstrates that rural guerrilla operations are very resistant to air interdiction. El Dorado Canyon illustrates that even if specific targets are vulnerable and destroyed, this may not be enough to disrupt or destroy their supporting network. It is essential to examine targeting the threat specifically in the unique

environment of the conflict. As important, is determining if damage effects can be measured, and the relationship damage has to the larger threat system.

The case studies in this monograph illustrate a common debate that arises when doubt exists over the effectiveness of air attack against particular targets. Rolling Thunder, the Linebacker campaigns, and Allied Force all utilized an air attack strategy against a capital city for leverage against the enemy leadership. It is important to remember that this airpower strategy must be applied in concert with other instruments of national power. Air attack alone is unlikely to coerce an enemy to concede. However, Allied Force and Linebacker I and II illustrate that when combined with a systemic attack encompassing economic and diplomatic pressures, the synergistic effect can bring about success. This success may be limited to coercing an enemy to make certain concessions, such as signing a peace agreement or military technical agreement. This does not guarantee any resolution of the actual political causes of the conflict and may be a temporary solution, as evidenced by Vietnam and Kosovo.

It is important to clarify the strategic political aims sought in the conflict. One method of analysis is identifying positive and negative aims. These can be at odds with each other in a given conflict, ultimately negating and restricting the military force. This was evident in Rolling Thunder under the Johnson Administration. Identification of this situation can allow the political objectives to be weighted, prioritized, or even altered. President Nixon resolved outstanding diplomatic pressures with China and Russia that diminished the effect of this

dissension. He was therefore able to create a better strategic political environment that enabled fewer constraints on his Linebacker campaigns.

The case studies in this paper also reinforce specific principles of war and tenets of airpower that are consistent with current Air Force doctrine. It is critical to mass and concentrate effects during air campaigns. Surprise is one of the inherent strengths that airpower brings to the battlespace. Simultaneity produces synergistic effects that can induce strategic paralysis upon an enemy. This paralysis enables initiative and momentum to be exploited, as well as psychological shock. The El Dorado Canyon and Linebacker campaigns are excellent examples of effective utilization of these principles and tenets.

Airpower is a force option that carries less risk both politically and militarily than committing ground troops to combat. Casualty rates are much lower. The case studies in this monograph indicate there is more public tolerance for air strikes than for body bags. National leaders may be particularly sensitive to this condition in a given conflict. If the acknowledged tolerance for risk is low, or if the risk tolerance level hasn't been determined, airpower presents an attractive force option. This is particularly true for humanitarian crises and for limited conflicts involving indirect or nebulous ties to national interests. It is a reasonable assumption that both public and political tolerance for risk increases as the link to national interests becomes stronger. This condition in particular can drive the political need to do something militarily, a concept discussed throughout this paper.

The problem with political use of airpower in these types of limited conflict is that it essentially represents an unwillingness of national leaders to commit to decisive use of military force. Even as Allied Force in Kosovo demonstrates, military leaders were not happy with the constraints place upon the employment of force, in that case, airpower. This suggests a new paradox involving the technology of war and the governing morality of war, particularly with humanitarian crises. There are other case studies such as Rwanda and Somalia where governments attempted to intervene militarily with unclear commitment or goals, which resulted in disaster, casualties, and ultimate abandonment of involvement.¹³¹

This study utilized the historical application of airpower to gain relevant insight into the relationship between the military means and political ends. Airpower will continue to influence the political process as a military option of force. Clarifying the relationship of airpower means and political ends is essential to effective airpower application in limited conflict. The critical point to realize, however, is that effective airpower application even when combined with effective economic, diplomatic, and informational power elements, may not bring about desired political end states that generate permanent resolution of conflicts.

ENDNOTES

¹ Ivo H. Daalder, *U.S. Diplomacy before the Kosovo War*, Statement before the Subcommittee on European Affairs, Committee on Foreign Relations, United States Senate, 28 September 1999. Daalder cites 3 reasons given by the Clinton Administration for their reluctance to deploy ground troops in Kosovo: 1) no support in Congress or in the country for deploying more troops to the Balkans, 2) the prospect of ground forces would have created major fissures within the NATO Alliance, particularly with Germany and Italy, and 3) Russia opposed the use of any force and would have broken off diplomatic relations immediately if ground troops entered Serbia.

² Carl Von Clausewitz, *On War*, Edited and translated by Michael Howard and Peter Paret, (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1976), 87.

³ Clausewitz, 87.

⁴ The political borders determined by the Treaty of Versailles at the end of World War I figured predominately in the Balkan conflicts of the 1980s and 1990s. See Robert Kaplan, *Balkan Ghost*, (New York: St. Martin's Press, 1993; Noel Malcolm, *Kosovo, A Short History*, (New York: HarperCollins, 1999), and Michael Ignatieff, *Virtual War, Kosovo and Beyond*, (New York: Metropolitan Books, 2000), 20.

⁵ It is important to note that the term "airpower" in this monograph is used to denote joint air assets. The term airpower should not be synonymous with only the U.S. Air Force. All four U.S. services have robust assets that operate in air and space and exploit that particular dimension. While the USAF may generally employ the preponderance of airpower, the U.S. has yet to conduct an air operation that consisted entirely of only USAF assets. All of the conflicts examined in this monograph employed joint air assets.

⁶ Walter J. Boyne, "The Fall of Saigon," *Air Force Magazine*, April 2000, 68.

⁷ Robert A. Pape, *Bombing to Win, Air Power and Coercion in War* (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1996), 174.

⁸ Mark Clodfelter, *The Limits of Air Power, The American Bombing of North Vietnam*, (New York: The Free Press, 1989), 203.

⁹ Clodfelter, xi. Clodfelter lists political controls, military controls, and operational controls as other elements that can limit airpower's effectiveness. These controls span such things as doctrine, moral concerns, enemy defenses, technology, and geography.

¹⁰ Robert Cowley and Geoffrey Parker, editors, *The Reader's Companion to Military History*, (Boston, MA: Houghton Mifflin Company, 1996), 492.

¹¹ Cowley and Parker, 492.

¹² Stanley Karnow, *Vietnam: A History*, (New York: Viking Press, 1983), 253.

¹³ Karnow, 400-410. Chapter 11 contains a detailed history of the early decisions to use airpower in Vietnam, covering both the Johnson administration and military leaders' advice and recommendations. Karnow also discusses Barrel Roll, a secret bombing campaign against infiltration routes in Laos. For information on this air operation during Vietnam, see Col. Perry

Lamy, *Barrel Roll 1968-1973: An Air Campaign in Support of National Policy*, (Maxwell AF Base, AL: Air University Press, September 1996).

¹⁴ Cowley and Parker, 492.

¹⁵ James Clay Thompson, *Rolling Thunder, Understanding Policy and Program Failure* (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 1980), 25. See also Karnow, 415, Pape, 177, and Clodfelter, 50-51.

¹⁶ Clausewitz, 92-94. Clausewitz relates the polarity of positive and negative political aims in war to the polarity between attack and defense. Positive aims support the attack while negative aims align with the defense. Clausewitz debates the merits of attack and defense throughout his volume, but Chapters Seven and Eight of Book Eight apply the theory to wars of limited aims and have significant merit relative to the political context of U.S. involvement in Vietnam.

¹⁷ Clodfelter, xi.

¹⁸ Clausewitz, 98-99.

¹⁹ Clodfelter, 41.

²⁰ Pape, 177-183. See also Clodfelter, 101.

²¹ Karnow, 415. Karnow quotes Johnson to illustrate the level of his involvement; "they can't even bomb an outhouse without my approval." See also Clodfelter, 85. Clodfelter further examines Johnson's political control, citing that final target approval took place at his Tuesday White House luncheons, and that these did not include any military representation until late October 1967 when General Wheeler began attending.

²² Clodfelter, xi.

²³ Pape, 176.

²⁴ Quoted in George C. Herring, *The Pentagon Papers*, Abridged Edition, (New York: MacGraw Hill, 1993), 112.

²⁵ Karnow, 415.

²⁶ Clodfelter, 43. Both McNamara and Rusk had played key roles in the Cuban missile crisis, undoubtedly leading to their fears of nuclear escalation.

²⁷ Thompson, 42-43.

²⁸ Thompson, 40-43. See also Pape, 181-184, and Clodfelter, Chapter 3. Each of these sources give a detailed account of the different strategies of Rolling Thunder, as well as the specific political and military advocates of each one.

²⁹ Thompson, 42.

³⁰ Thompson, 42.

³¹ Clodfelter, 100.

³² Clodfelter, 100. See also Pape, 189-190.

³³ Pape, 189. Pape cites that the Air Force leaders should have recognized that the industrial economy of North Vietnam was tiny by any standard, producing only 12% of a gross national product of \$1.6 billion in 1965.

³⁴ Pape, 183.

³⁵ Thompson, 42.

³⁶ Clodfelter, 112-114. See also Thompson, 64.

³⁷ Pape, 196.

³⁸ Pape, 196. Only six thousand combat troops remained by March of 1972, and over ninety thousand other military personnel had been withdrawn.

³⁹ Clodfelter, 148.

⁴⁰ John Morrocco, *The Vietnam Experience: Rain of Fire, Air War, 1969-1973*, (Boston, MA: Boston Publishing Company, 1985), 130.

⁴¹ Clodfelter, 149-150. See also Karnow, 645-647.

⁴² Morrocco, 131. See also Pape, 199.

⁴³ Karnow, 650. See also Pape, 200-201, who states that airpower greatly reduced the flow of resources to the North Vietnamese and that Linebacker I halted the offensive.

⁴⁴ See Karnow, 650-652 and Clodfelter, 174-175 for detailed political analysis of what went wrong with negotiations of the cease fire with South Vietnam. Essentially, the South was wary of the agreement, desiring total surrender from Hanoi and blamed the U.S. for posturing a collapse of the South to communism.

⁴⁵ Pape, 201.

⁴⁶ Pape, 201.

⁴⁷ Morrocco, 160.

⁴⁸ Karnow, 652-654; and Morrocco, 160. The American public was distracted with Watergate and was largely apathetic to the bombings as ground troops were home. However, the international community, the American media, and partisan members of Congress condemned the air offensive as unprovoked, brutal, and savage. It was likened to carpet bombings during World War II, primarily because of the heavy use of B-52 bombers that had not been used in Vietnam until this campaign. However, both Karnow and Morrocco cite the difference between civilian casualties and destruction in Linebacker II and the Dresden, Hamburg, and Tokyo raids. Casualties were actually very low in Linebacker II, as buildings in the cities had not been repaired or occupied since Linebacker I. Additionally, new laser-guided and electro-optically guided bombs allowed for greater precision and accuracy. See Morrocco, 136.

⁴⁹ Clodfelter, 201.

⁵⁰ Boyne, "The Fall of Saigon," 68-74. Boyne gives a detailed account of the final battles that led to South Vietnam's fall. Over 5,000 remaining American citizens were evacuated from Saigon in the final days, and over 600,000 foreign refugees, mostly Vietnamese, were brought to the states. Additionally, Karnow, 643, quotes President Nixon saying, "all the airpower in the world

won't save South Vietnam if the South Vietnamese aren't able to hold on the ground."

⁵¹ Pape, 176.

⁵² Air Force Doctrine Document 1, (Washington, DC: Headquarters U.S. Air Force, September 1997), 15, 20, 24, 26. Intensity is addressed under a principle of war known as mass, as well as under a tenet of aerospace power known as concentration. Surprise is another well-known principle of war. Simultaneity is addressed under the aerospace tenet of synergistic effects. For a specific view of simultaneity in airpower employment known as parallel warfare, see also Colonel David Deptula, *Firing for Effect, Change in the Nature of Warfare*, (Arlington, VA: Aerospace Education Foundation, August 1995), 6.

⁵³ Walter J. Boyne, "El Dorado Canyon," *Air Force Magazine*, March 1999, 58.

⁵⁴ Brian L. Davis, *Qaddafi, Terrorism, and the Origins of the US Attack on Libya*, (New York: Praeger Publishers, 1990) ix.

⁵⁵ Boyne, "El Dorado Canyon," 58. In November 1985, Abu Nidal's group was responsible for an Egyptian Air hi-jacking that resulted in 60 deaths. In December 1985, his terrorists conducted attacks at airports in Rome and Vienna, killing 20. Qaddafi publicly praised the terrorists and referred to the slain ones as martyrs. For a comprehensive account of Middle-Eastern sponsored terrorism in the 1970's and 80's, as well as public statements by Qaddafi, see Brian L. Davis, *Qaddafi, Terrorism, and the Origins of the US Attack on Libya*, Chapter 3 and the Appendix.

⁵⁶ Davis, 64; and Boyne, "El Dorado Canyon," 58.

⁵⁷ Boyne, "El Dorado Canyon," 58.

⁵⁸ Davis, 104.

⁵⁹ Robert E. Stumpf, "Air War with Libya," US Naval *Proceedings* No. 112, (August, 1986), 46. See also Davis, Chapter 4. The debate over motivation is outside the scope of this paper. In any event, US embassies, consulates, and trade missions abroad were notified in advance of the intent to challenge Libya. Foreign nations were also notified, including the USSR.

⁶⁰ Davis, 104-105; and Boyne, "El Dorado Canyon," 58.

⁶¹ Boyne, "El Dorado Canyon," 58.

⁶² Davis, 116; and Boyne, "El Dorado Canyon," 59.

⁶³ Davis, 121. Libyan plots were uncovered for an attack on the US consulate in Munich, as well as for the bombing of the US chancery and embassy in Africa. In Latin America, a car with Libyan diplomatic tags was tailing a school bus of American children.

⁶⁴ Colonel Stephen E. Anno and LTC William E. Einspahr, Extract from *Command and Control and Communications Lessons Learned: Iranian Rescue, Falklands Conflict, Grenada Invasion, Libya Raid*, Air War College Research Report, No. AU-AWC-88-043, (Maxwell Air Force Base AL: Air University), 48.

⁶⁵ Anno and Einspahr, 48.

⁶⁶ Davis, 119.

⁶⁷ Pape, 28-29.

⁶⁸ Davis, 119.

⁶⁹ Anno and Einspahr, 48. See also Boyne, "El Dorado Canyon," 59.

⁷⁰ Anno and Einspahr, 49. The authors note that the French Embassy in Tripoli and several neighboring buildings were also damaged in the raid, a result of inadvertent bombing. They were not targeted. See also Boyne, 59. Boyne notes that Qaddafi's house in Tripoli also was damaged, but does not speculate as to whether it was targeted.

⁷¹ Major Billy R. Shrader, *Targeting National Security: The True Mechanism Behind Effective National Coercion*, Thesis, School of Advanced Airpower Studies, (Maxwell Air Force Base AL: Air University, June 1997), 54.

⁷² Shrader, 54.

⁷³ Davis, 137; and Boyne, "El Dorado Canyon," 62. See also Shrader, 54.

⁷⁴ Davis, 138; and Boyne, "El Dorado Canyon," 62.

⁷⁵ Davis gives the most comprehensive accounting of figures and sources, 139-143. Boyne, "El Dorado Canyon," 62, echoes these figures. Boyne was former director of the National Air and Space Museum in Washington, DC, and is an accomplished Air Force historian. One U.S. F-111 was reported to be on fire in flight and went down. The two pilots were killed, only one of the bodies was recovered when Libya returned the remains to the U.S. three years after the raid. Libyan accounts of the death of an adopted daughter of Qaddafi have never been substantiated.

⁷⁶ Davis, 143-151.

⁷⁷ Davis, 143.

⁷⁸ Davis, 143. The U.S. publicly flew SR-71 aircraft over Tripoli in the days after the attack, but these aircraft flew well above the limits of any Libyan air defense systems. In an effort to save face, however, the Qaddafi regime repeatedly falsely reported "shoot downs" of as many as 28 U.S. aircraft on Libyan television. They claimed the pilots donned civilian clothing and "blended" with the local population.

⁷⁹ Pape, 29; Davis, 144; Boyne, "El Dorado Canyon," 62. England was the only ally to be directly involved as the U.S. launched some of the planes in the attack from U.S. bases in that country. See Pape, 80-81, for a discussion of airpower coercion by political decapitation, that is, targeting the leader of a belligerent nation in the hopes that it will end the conflict.

⁸⁰ Davis, 145-146. Supporters were Great Britain, Israel, Dominica, St. Lucia, Grenada, Honduras, Chad, South Africa, Singapore, Australia, and Canada.

⁸¹ Davis, 149. The Swedish Prime Minister also reported that during his talks with Gorbachev, the Soviet leader stated his "general displeasure" with Qaddafi.

⁸² Davis, 168.

⁸³ Davis, 149. Iraq also shortly requested the Arab League consider expelling Libya. Additionally, an Algerian diplomat said his government could not accept Libya's methods in spite of a long friendship with Qaddafi.

⁸⁴ U.S. Senate, Committee on the Judiciary, Subcommittee on Security and Terrorism, *Libyan Sponsored Terrorism*, (Washington DC, 1986), 88-91.

⁸⁵ Pape, 355.

⁸⁶ Pape, 355-356; Davis, 161-163. Both sources give detailed accounts of individual incidents occurring after the air raid and attributed to organizations with Libya or with declarations of retaliation for the air raid.

⁸⁷ U.S. Department of State, *Patterns of Global Terrorism*, (Washington, DC: Department of State, 1987), 1, 16, 37.

⁸⁸ Fawn Vrazo, "For Lockerbie Families, a Long Wait Ends," *Kansas City Star*, (Kansas City, MO: Knight-Ridder, Inc., 7 May 2000) 1, 14. The actual international trial of two accused, alleged Libyan intelligence agents for the bombing has not taken place as of May 2000. By late 1989, Palestinian terrorist groups were thought to be the suspects. It was not until 1991 that the two Libyans were indicted. The two suspects did not surrender to Western authorities until April 1999, and it involved efforts by the U.N.

⁸⁹ E.P. Thompson and Mary Kaldor, *Mad Dogs: The US Raids on Libya*, (London: Pluto Press, 1986), 3.

⁹⁰ Thompson and Kaldor, 3-6. The authors tie El Dorado Canyon to foreign strategy implemented by the Reagan Administration. They postulate that the Cold War and nuclear deterrence were critical factors driving President Reagan to demonstrate a greater readiness to use conventional force. However, they do not believe the strategic political environment in the Middle East at this time warranted the air attack. The forward confesses that the book was written very quickly within two weeks of the Libyan raid. While much of their theory has been overcome by historical events, the book offers thoughtful analysis to the political decisions surrounding the air attack. Brian L. Davis identifies these authors as "British anti-NATO activists" (p. 192) but says he can only discount one essay in their book.

⁹¹ Davis, 139.

⁹² Davis, 138-139.

⁹³ Davis, 145.

⁹⁴ US Information Agency Washington File, *Key Quotes on US Strikes Against Terrorism, Statements on August 20 Actions in Afghanistan, Sudan*, Internet, available at <http://www.fas.org/man/dod-1/ops/docs/98082802-ppo.html>. Accessed 25 April 2000. See Reasons for the US strikes, President Clinton White House Statement, August 20, 1998; and President Clinton, Radio Address to the Nation, August 22, 1998, both on page 2.

⁹⁵ US Information Agency, *Foreign Media Reaction Daily Digest*; Internet, available at <http://www.fas.org/man/dod-1/ops/docs/www8824.html>. Accessed 25 April 2000. See Quotes by Region, page 1, "Analysts in many quarters continued to debate the so-called 'Lewinsky' angle of the story, with many charging that the U.S. launched the air strikes to divert attention from President Clinton's domestic 'difficulties.' The Lewinsky angle refers to the woman that President Clinton had admitted having an affair with. A few European countries and Israel refuted this theory, saying that the embassy attacks with hundreds of casualties was a good enough reason to launch the attacks.

⁹⁶ US Information Agency, *Foreign Media Reaction Daily Digest*, 1-4. "Both doubters and

qualified supporters stressed that the U.S. case would be strengthened if Washington would present clear evidence that the attacked sites had demonstrable links to terrorist organizations." In particular, a Berlin editorial read that the "U.S. certainly had the right to strike back, but that President Clinton must now present evidence. This is especially true for the factory in Khartoum."

⁹⁷ US Information Agency Washington File, *Report on U.S. Public Support for Strikes on Terrorist Sites*, 1-3. Polls indicated a majority of 55 percent of Americans approved of the attack, with an average of 58 percent believing the motivation was directly tied to counter terrorism. An average of 30 percent believed the attack was to divert attention from the Lewinsky controversy.

⁹⁸ Jeffrey Record, *Serbia and Vietnam: A Preliminary Comparison of U.S. Decisions to Use Force*, (Maxwell Air Force Base, AL: Center for Strategy and Technology, Air War College, Air University, May, 1999), 3-6. See also Department of Defense, Report to Congress, *Kosovo/Operation Allied Force After-Action Report*, (Washington, DC: 31 January 2000), 1-9.

⁹⁹ Noel Malcolm, *Kosovo, A Short History*, (New York: HarperCollins, 1998), 340-342.

¹⁰⁰ Malcolm, 343. Malcolm details Milosevic's rise to power as well as specific policies and actions that led to NATO involvement in Chapter 17.

¹⁰¹ Department of Defense, Report to Congress, *Kosovo/Operation Allied Force After-Action Report*, (Washington, DC: 31 January 2000), A-7 and A-10. The appendix is a chronology of international involvement in Kosovo throughout 1998 and 1999.

¹⁰² Michael Ignatieff, *Virtual War, Kosovo and Beyond*, (New York: Metropolitan Books, 2000), 5.

¹⁰³ NATO statement issued at the Extraordinary Meeting of the North Atlantic Council held at NATO on 12 April 1999, reaffirmed by Heads of State and Government in Washington on 23 April 1999. Available from (<http://www.nato.int/kosovo/history.htm>); Internet; accessed 15 December 1999.

¹⁰⁴ Department of Defense, Report to Congress, 7.

¹⁰⁵ Department of Defense, Report to Congress, 3-4. In addition to being U.S. interests at stake, these were also identified as the interests of NATO allies in the conflict.

¹⁰⁶ Ignatieff, 14-15.

¹⁰⁷ Daalder, Statement before the Subcommittee on European Affairs.

¹⁰⁸ *Air Force Magazine*, "Verbatim Special, The Balkan War," (June 1999), 47. Cohen reiterated to the Senate Armed Services Committee on 15 April 1999, "the military mission...is to reduce, diminish, degrade the military capability that Milosevic's forces have to conduct their campaign of brutal repression."

¹⁰⁹ Record, 10. Charles Krauthammer is also quoted as saying, "Allied Force is not war. This is 'asset' depletion."

¹¹⁰ Fareed Zakaria, "Victory, But at a Price," *Newsweek*, 14 June 1999, 28.

¹¹¹ Ignatieff, 42.

¹¹² John A. Tirpak, "Short's View of the Air Campaign," *Air Force Magazine*, (Arlington, VA: Air Force Association, September 1999), 43. General Short never believed that the Serbian

Third Army was a center of gravity, nor did he feel that they were going to be able to stop ethnic cleansing. He said most of the damage had been done before they [the coalition] ever started attacking ground targets. General Short feels that in future conflicts there would be little justification in trying to whittle down an enemy army without a coalition army in the field or unless the opposing army in the field has been defined as a center of gravity. This article notes that General Short was a combat veteran of almost 300 missions in Vietnam, an experience that undoubtedly shaped his view of the conflict, the enemy and the target set.

¹¹³ Tirpak, "Short's View of the Air Campaign," 43.

¹¹⁴ Air Force Magazine, "Verbatim Special, The Balkan War," 47.

¹¹⁵ Record, 4.

¹¹⁶ Tirpak, "Short's View of the Air Campaign," 45. General Short claimed that General Clark accepted the reasoning that sustained and parallel operations could be conducted against the Yugoslav army and against Belgrade targets. Operations also shifted from night-only to 24 hours a day at this time. General Short was convinced that his advocated target set in Belgrade would upset the leadership base of Milosevic, by angering a civilian population and political leaders into blaming Milosevic for their misery. For a review of the change in air strategy by the US and NATO, see Tirpak, "Victory in Kosovo," *Air Force Magazine*, (July 1999), 24. Tirpak cites a weather change allowing better air operations, and higher commitment from allies on intensifying the air campaign due to Milosevic's resolve and the mounting likelihood of having to initiate a ground campaign if results did not begin to materialize.

¹¹⁷ Record, 9.

¹¹⁸ Tony Judt, "Tyrannized by Weaklings," *New York Times*, 5 April 1999.

¹¹⁹ Zakaria, 29.

¹²⁰ Tirpak, "Short's View of the Air Campaign," 47.

¹²¹ Tirpak, "Victory in Kosovo," 24.

¹²² *Air Force Magazine*, "Verbatim Special, The Balkan War," 47. Secretary of State Madeleine Albright stated on PBS "Newshour" on 24 March 1999, "I don't see this as a long-term operation. I think that this is something... that is achievable within a relatively short period of time." However, less than two weeks later, she stated on NBC's "Meet the Press" that "We never expected this to be over quickly...we are in there for a long time." (See Record, 4). Pentagon spokesman Kenneth Bacon also stated in a briefing on 23 March 1999, "We have plans for a swift and severe air campaign...We hope that relatively quickly...the Serbs will realize they've made a mistake." But then President Clinton stated in a press briefing on 5 April, "We are prepared to sustain this effort for the long haul." (*Air Force Magazine*, "Verbatim Special, The Balkan War," 47). See Record specifically for a detailed analysis of the parallels between Kosovo and Vietnam.

¹²³ Daalder, Statement before the Subcommittee on European Affairs.

¹²⁴ Department of Defense, Report to Congress, A-9.

¹²⁵ Department of Defense, Report to Congress, A-10.

¹²⁶ Ignatieff, 4. Ignatieff refers to the Kosovo conflict as a virtual war in the sense that it was fought under an ambiguous political state, with very little reality of actual conflict or the human repercussions of war. His book discusses the ramifications of such wars.

¹²⁷ Anthony Cordesman, *The Lessons and Non-Lessons of the Air and Missile War in Kosovo*, Executive Summary, (Washington DC: Center for Strategic and International Studies, Revised 20 July 1999), 3-4.

¹²⁸ Department of Defense, Report to Congress, 11.

¹²⁹ Linda D. Kozaryn, American Forces Press Service, "Cohen, Shelton Say NATO's Patience, Precision Paid Off," DefenseLink News, 11 June 1999.

¹³⁰ Zakaria, 29.

¹³¹ See Michael Ignatieff, *Virtual War*, *Blood and Belonging*, and *The Warrior's Honor* for a compelling examination of this theme. Ignatieff's trilogy focuses on the way Western governments have used military power to protect human rights since the end of the Cold War.

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